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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Veronica Lynn Calver is the mother of RC. and, as such, has a recognized 
fundamental right to parent RC. Raymond Calver, RC.'s father, filed for divorce two 
days prior to Veronica Calver moving to Tennessee with RC. and Ms. Calver's two 
older children (neither the natural or adoptive children of Raymond Calver). An Ada 
County magistrate issued a pro forma Joint Temporary Restraining Order (hereinafter, 
JTRO) upon the divorce filing, prohibiting either Raymond or Veronica from "removing" 
R.C. from the State of Idaho for periods exceeding 72 hours. Ms. Calver was arrested 
in Tennessee and, rather than being charged with contempt of court for allegedly 
violating the JTRO, she was charged with custodial interference and was later 
convicted. 
Ms. Calver raised three issues in her Appellant's Brief. First, she asserted that, 
because the Information alleged that Ms. Calver violated only those of Mr. Calver's 
custody rights arising from the JTRO, and the JTRO did not actually bar Ms. Calver 
from taking, keeping, or withholding RC. from Raymond Calver, but merely stated that 
neither party could remove RC. from the State of Idaho except for periods not 
exceeding 72 hours, there was insufficient evidence to demonstrate that she was 
"without lawful authority" to violate any of Mr. Calver's custodial rights by taking, 
keeping, or withholding Re. from Mr. Calver. Thus, Ms. Calver asserted that the State 
failed to provide sufficient evidence to support her conviction for custodial interference. 
Next, Ms. Calver asserted that if this Court finds the JTRO established that 
Raymond Calver had a custodial or parental right to have RC. somewhere in the State 
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of Idaho, the jury instructions failed to require the jury to find a violation of this specific 
right. The jury was instructed that they must convict Veronica Calver if they found she 
"took, kept, or withheld" R.C. from Raymond Calver, conduct which Ms. Calver had the 
lawful authority to engage in, rather than requiring the jury to find that Ms. Calver "took" 
R.C. out of the Idaho for longer than 24 hours. As such, Ms. Calver asserted that the 
jury instructions were erroneous and the error was not harmless, requiring this Court to 
vacate her conviction 
Finally, Ms. Calver asserted that the jury instructions contained a fatal variance 
as they instructed the jury that a person's "right to custody" may arise either from a 
specific custody order, the allegation made in the Information, or from "the equal 
custodial rights of each parent in the absence of a custody order," an allegation not 
made in the Information. Because the jury instructions allowed the jury to convict 
Ms. Calver on a charge not made, she asserts that her conviction must be vacated and 
her case remanded for a new trial. 
In its Respondent's Brief, the State has made various assertions in support of its 
claim that this Court should affirm Ms. Calver's conviction. This Reply Brief is 
necessary to address some of the State's assertions. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Ms. Calver's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief in detail, 
but are incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
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ISSUES 
1. Should this Court vacate Ms. Calver's conviction for custodial interference as the 
State failed to provide sufficient evidence that Ms. Calver was "without lawful 
authority" to "take, keep or withhold" R.C. from Mr. Calver? 
2. Was Ms. Calver's right to due process of law violated by the district court 
erroneously instructing the jury on the findings of fact necessary to support a 
guilty verdict? 
3. Does there exist a fatal variance between the Information and the jury 
instructions, as the jury instructions advised that Mr. Calver's custodial rights 
could arise either from a custodial order, as alleged in the Information, or from his 
equal custodial right as a parent, which was not alleged in the Information? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
This Court Should Vacate Ms. Calver's Conviction For Custodial Interference As The 
State Failed To Provide Sufficient Evidence Ms. Calver Was "Without Lawful Authority" 
To "Take, Keep Or Withhold" R.e. From Mr. Calver 
A person cannot be found guilty of custodial interference unless the state proves, 
beyond a reasonable doubt, the person did not have the lawful authority" to interfere 
with another's custodial rights. The only limitation on Ms. Calver's right to parent in this 
case was the JTRO issued by a magistrate court when Mr. Calver filed for divorce. The 
Information in this case specifically alleged that the only rights Mr. Calver enjoyed that 
were purportedly violated by Ms. Calver, "[arose] from [the] temporary restraining order 
regarding the child in CV-DR-2011-16503." As such, the State could not convict 
Ms. Calver of custodial interference absent proof that she both violated the specific 
terms of JTRO, and that the JTRO granted Mr. Calver the very custodial rights 
Ms. Calver was alleged to have interfered with. 
The State appears to agree with Ms. Calver's argument that, as R.C.'s mother, 
she has a fundamental constitutional right to make parenting decisions that, in this case, 
was limited only by the terms of the JTRO. (See Appellant's Brief, pp.9-11; 
Respondent's Brief, pp. 7 -8.) The State's argument that there was sufficient evidence 
that to support a jury finding that Ms. Calver violated the specific terms of the JTRO is 
well-taken, and had it been alleged, a judge could have reasonably found her to be in 
contempt of court. (See Respondent's Brief, pp.9-10.) However, the State's argument 
that there was sufficient evidence to demonstrate that Mr. Calver's rights were violated 
by Ms. Calver, merely because he is R. C.'s father (Respondent's Brief, pp.10-12), is 
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without merit. Ms. Calver was not alleged to have violated Mr. Calver's "equal custodial 
rights ... in the absence of a custody order"; rather, she was specifically alleged to have 
violated Mr. Calver's rights as provided by the JTRO, rights that the State apparently 
does not now contend were violated by Ms. Calver. 
Idaho Code § 1S-4506(a) reads as follows: 
A person commits child custody interference if the person, whether a 
parent or other, or agent of that person, intentionally and without lawful 
authority: 
(a) Takes, entices away, keeps or withholds any minor child from a parent 
or another person or institution having custody, joint custody, visitation or 
other parental rights, whether such rights arise from temporary or 
permanent custody order, or from the equal custodial rights of each parent 
in the absence of a custody order[.] 
I.C. § 18-4506(a) (emphasis added). By its plain language, the custodial right of a 
person may arise either from a specific custody order or from the equal custodial right of 
each parent Id However, the State chose not to allege that Mr. Calver's "equal 
custodial rights .. , in the absence of a custody order" were violated. The State 
specifically alleged, 
That the Defendant, VERONICA L CALVER AKA HANEY, on or 
between the Sth day of September, 2011 and the 10th day of October, 
2011, in the County of Ada, State of Idaho, did intentionally and without 
lawful authority, take and/or keep and/or withhold, a minor child, R C., a 
child of the age of two (2), from Raymond Calver and who has joint 
custody and/or other parental rights arising from temporary 
restraining order regarding the child in CV-DR-2011-16503 and/or after 
commencement of an action relating to child visitation or custody but prior 
to the issuance of an order and where the defendant took the child out of 
state and where the child has not voluntarily been returned unharmed to 
Idaho. 
(R, pp.29-30 (emphasis added).) Because the State did not allege the alternative 
means of committing the crime, the State cannot rely upon evidence that Ms. Calver 
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committed the crime in an alternative manner. C.f State v. Folk, 151 Idaho 327, 340 
(2011) (recognizing that where the defendant was charged with committing lewd 
conduct through oral-genital contact, the district court erred by instructing the jury that 
the definition of lewd-conduct includes alternative means of committing the crime, as the 
defendant could not be convicted of committing lewd conduct through means not 
alleged in the charging document). In short, because the Information alleged that 
Mr. Calver's parental rights specifically arose through the JTRO, absent evidence that 
Ms. Calver's actions deprived him of those rights granted through the JTRO, there was 
insufficient evidence to support her conviction. 
For the reasons more fully articulated in section I of the Appellant's Brief, 
Ms. Calver asserts there was insufficient evidence to support her conviction and this 
Court must vacate her conviction. 
II. 
Ms. Calver's Right To Due Process Of Law Was Violated By The District Court 
Erroneously Instructing The Jury On The Findings Of Facts Necessary To Support A 
Guilty Verdict 
Ms. Calver argued in her Appellant's Brief that, should this Court find there was 
sufficient evidence to sustain her conviction, it nevertheless must vacate her conviction 
because the jury instructions erroneously informed the jury they could find Ms. Calver 
guilty if they found she "kept and/or withheld" R.C. from Raymond Calver, as an 
alternative to finding she "took" R.C. from Mr. Calver. (Appellant's Brief, pp.16-28.) As 
such, Ms. Calver asserted the jury was falsely instructed that they could find her guilty if 
they found that she engaged in conduct she had the lawful authority to engage in. Id. 
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In its Respondent's Brief, the State generally argues that Ms. Calver has not met 
her burden under a Perri fundamental error analysis. (Respondent's Brief, pp.12-20.) 
The State's argument is generally unremarkable and, therefore, Ms. Calver relies upon 
the arguments and authorities she provided on this issue in the Appellant's Brief. 
However, it should be noted that the State is now taking a position contrary to the 
argument it made to the jury in this case. In its Respondent's Brief, the State asserts 
the following: 
However, reviewing the instructions as a whole reveals that the 
"kept and/or withheld" language in instruction no. 10 was, at worst, 
unnecessary and irrelevant to the jury's determination. Its inclusion 
does not amount to a constitutional violation. Regardless of whether the 
jury found that Calver took, kept, or withheld R.C. from Raymond, it was 
also required to find that Calver committed such an act or omission 
"without lawful authority." (R., p.80.) Calver's custodial authority was only 
addressed in two ways at trial - one, in terms of the limitations placed on 
it by the joint temporary restraining order (which prevented her from 
"taking" R.C. out of the state), and two, as part of her necessity defense in 
that Calver contended that she was not "without lawful authority" to act 
because she was doing so to protect R.C. and herself from imminent 
physical harm. There was no basis for the jury to find that Calver 
"kept and/or withheld" R.C. "without lawful authority," and thus, 
there is no basis for concluding that the jury could have convicted 
Calver based on legal conduct. Thus, while the "kept and/or 
withheld" language was unnecessary and irrelevant to the jury's 
determination, it did not violate Calver's constitutional rights. 
(Respondent's Brief, p.16 (emphasis added).) It appears that the State agrees with 
Ms. Calver's argument that she could not be convicted if the jury found that she "kept 
and/or withheld" R.C. from Mr. Calver. However, in addition to the fact that the jury 
instructions required the jury to convict Ms. Calver if they found that she "kept and/or 
withheld" R.C. from Mr. Calver, the prosecutor specifically argued this point to the jury. 
During closing arguments, the prosecutor stressed to the jury the State did not have to 
1 See State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209 (2010). 
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prove Ms. Calver merely "removed" RC. from Idaho, but that they sustained their 
burden if they showed she "kept" or "withheld" RC. from Mr. Calver. (Tr.2/20/12, p.264, 
Ls. 7 -12 (prosecutor arguing "She took and kept or withheld the child" and "She took 
[RC.] to Tennessee without lawful authority."); p.265, Ls.12-16 (prosecutor arguing 
Ms. Calver knew about the order because an officer told her about it (which occurred 
after she left Idaho)); p.288, Ls.15-21 (prosecutor arguing the "took and/or kept and/or 
withheld" language shows that the State need prove only one of those factors, not all 
three.)) As such, the State cannot now rely upon its belief that the jury would have 
understood that they could only find Ms. Calver guilty if they found she "took" RC. away 
from Mr. Calver. In short, the State presented evidence that Ms. Calver "kept" or 
"withheld" RC. from Mr. Calver and argued that the jury could find her guilty for that 
behavior. The error is fundamental and not harmless. 
For the reasons more fully articulated in section II of the Appellant's Brief, this 
Court should vacate Ms. Calver's conviction. 
III. 
There Exists A Fatal Variance Between The Information And The Jury Instructions, As 
The Jury Instructions Alleged Mr. Calver's Custodial Rights Could Arise Either From A 
Custodial Order, As Alleged In The Information, Or From His Equal Custodial Right As 
A Parent, Which Was Not Alleged In The Information 
In her Appellant's Brief, Ms. Calver asserted that the jury instructions erroneously 
stated Mr. Calver's custodial or other parental rights arose either from the JTRO or his 
"equal custodial rights" as RC.'s father. (Appellant's Brief, pp.29-33.) Because the 
Information alleged Mr. Calver's custodial or parental rights stem directly from the 
JTRO, not from anywhere else, Ms. Calver asserted that this additional "equal custodial 
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rights" language constitutes a fatal variance requiring this Court to vacate her 
conviction. Id. 
In its Respondent's Brief, the State generally argues that Ms. Calver has failed to 
meet her burden under a Perri fundamental error analysis. (Respondent's Brief, 
pp.20-27.) The State's argument is generally unremarkable and, therefore, Ms. Calver 
relies upon the arguments and authorities she provided on this issue in the Appellant's 
Brief. However, the State argues that rather than alleging that Mr. Calver's parental 
rights, as allegedly violated by Ms. Calver, arose only from the JTRO, the Information 
alleges that those rights arose either from the JTRO or Mr. Calver's "joint custody." 
(Respondent's Brief, pp.23-25.) This argument is without merit. 
As noted above, The Information specifically alleged, 
That the Defendant, VERONICA L CALVER AKA HANEY, on or 
between the 8th day of September, 2011 and the 10th day of October, 
2011, in the County of Ada, State of Idaho, did intentionally and without 
lawful authority, take and/or keep and/or withhold, a minor child, R. C., a 
child of the age of two (2), from Raymond Calver and who has joint 
custody and/or other parental rights arising from temporary 
restraining order regarding the child in CV -DR-2011-16503 and/or after 
commencement of an action relating to child visitation or custody but prior 
to the issuance of an order and where the defendant took the child out of 
state and where the child has not voluntarily been returned unharmed to 
Idaho. 
(R., pp.29-30 (emphasis added).) Although recognizing that Ms. Calver's reading of this 
Information is "plausible" (see Respondent's Brief, p.24, f.n. 2), the State nevertheless 
asserts that, "the information alleged that Raymond was a qualified victim pursuant to 
I.C. § 18-4506(a), and that his custodial authority came from: (1) his joint custody, 
2 See fn. 1 above. 
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and/or (2) other parental rights arising from the temporary restraining order regarding 
the child in CV-DR-2001-16503." (Respondent's Brief, p.24.) 
The State's argument fails in that it equates the term "joint custody" with the term 
"equal custodial rights of each parent in the absence of a custody order" as is contained 
in Idaho Code § 18-4506(a). However, the term "joint custody" has a specific meaning 
under Idaho law. Idaho Code § 32-717B(1) defines the term as follows: 
(1) "Joint custody" means an order awarding custody of the minor child 
or children to both parents and providing that physical custody shall be 
shared by the parents in such a way as to assure the child or children of 
frequent and continuing contact with both parents. The court may award 
either joint physical custody or joint legal custody or both as between the 
parents or parties as the court determines is for the best interests of the 
minor child or children. If the court declines to enter an order awarding 
joint custody, the court shall state in its decision the reasons for 
denial of an award of joint custody. 
I.C. § 32-717B(1) (emphasis added). Under Idaho law, the term "joint custody" refers to 
custody specifically awarded by a custody order. Thus, contrary to the State's 
argument, where the Information alleged that Mr. Calver "has joint custody and/or other 
parental rights arising from temporary restraining order regarding the child in CV-OR-
2011-16503," the Information specifically alleged that this "joint custody" arose 
specifically from the JTRO. The State's contrary interpretation of the allegation 
contained in its own Information is simply inconsistent with the definition of "joint 
custody" provided by Idaho statute. Thus, Ms. Calver's interpretation of this term is the 
only plausible interpretation. 
For the reasons more fully articulated in section "I of the Appellant's Brief, this 
Court should vacate Ms. Calver's conviction. 
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CONCLUSION 
Ms. Calver respectfully requests that this Court vacate her conviction and instruct 
the district court to enter a judgment of acquittal. Alternatively, she respectfully requests 
that this Court vacate her conviction and remand her case to the district court for a new 
tria I. 
DATED this 16th day of January, 2013. 
JASON C. PINTLER 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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